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Executive Summary 
 
Throughout the past 15 years, the United States has experienced a revolution in mortgage 
finance. Our mortgage markets have changed dramatically and become much more complex. 
These changes have had many positive aspects but also some serious negative consequences. 
 
On the positive side, many new technological innovations were implemented in the financial 
services industry such as credit scoring, expanded mortgage securitization and automated 
underwriting. These innovations, combined with policy changes and a period of historically low-
interest rates, created unprecedented access to credit for many Americans—allowing them to 
purchase homes and tap their home equity, providing liquidity to many low- and moderate-
income families. 
 
However, this era of easy credit came with many challenges. The complexity of the new 
mortgage market came with an array of new players, options, and products that thoroughly 
confused most consumers—leading many of them to choose inferior and risky products.  
Subprime lending also exploded during the last decade with its aggressive marketing techniques 
and its mortgage broker sales channel. Overall, an under-regulated lending market produced 
risky, costly and exotic mortgages that eventually produced a system-wide crisis that challenges 
the basic safety and soundness of the nation’s mortgage lending industry. 
 
This leads us to the current situation:  the nation has 54 million mortgage borrowers and 7.1 
million hold subprime mortgages (more than 13 percent of all loans).1 These risky subprime 
mortgages have been defaulting at rates up to 20 times higher than the rates of prime mortgages.2  
As of the fourth quarter 2007, 1.2 million foreclosures are in process while another 1.8 million 
loans are seriously delinquent.3 All told, more than two million foreclosures totaling up to $3 
trillion in value are expected in 2008-2009.4 The damage has spread from subprime to prime 
mortgage markets which are now experiencing record levels of default, as well. Researchers 
have also noted this contagion effect spreading internationally, with housing bubbles now 
bursting in Ireland, Spain, England, and other countries.5 
 
With housing values declining in many U.S. markets, an estimated 8.8 million homeowners now 
have mortgages worth more than the value of their homes, leaving them in risky situations and 
unable to refinance their mortgages for the immediate future.6 If price declines continue to 
accelerate, this number could double in the next year. The negative impacts of declining home 
values and rising defaults affect not only the families involved, but also their neighbors, the 
larger community and the nation as a whole. “This downward spiral of lost confidence and credit 
contraction threatens to touch off the worst recession and most serious social crisis of the post-
World War II era,” says Eugene A. Ludwig, comptroller of the currency from 1993-1998.7 
 
                                                 
1
 Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey, Fourth Quarter 2007. March 2008. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Mark Zandi, Statement before the House Judiciary Committee United States House of Representatives. October 
30, 2007. http://judiciary.house.gov/OversightTestimony.aspx?ID=1188  
5
 Mark Lander, “U.S. housing collapse spreads overseas,” Herald Tribune, April 14, 2008. 
6
  Mark Zandi, Moody’s Economy.com. 
7
 American Banker. April 4, 2008. 
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Every day headlines publicize the growing subprime mortgage crisis and its tsunami-like effect 
on communities across the nation and credit markets across the world. This briefing paper will 
explore how this crisis developed, highlight strategies that some communities are using to 
mitigate its negative impacts, review recent federal proposals to address the situation and discuss 
possible intervention strategies that foundations can pursue to address the crisis.   
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Background 
 
Historically, major life crises such as loss of employment, divorce, overwhelming debts and 
disability have been the “trigger events” for foreclosures — but the causes behind the recent 
surge in foreclosures are different. The current crisis largely appears to be the result of structural 
changes in the U.S. mortgage market within the past decade.  
 
For all practical purposes, the current foreclosure surge is being laid at the doorstep of the 
subprime lending industry. The subprime market was developed in the early 1990s primarily to 
provide home refinance loans to households with impaired or limited credit history. Borrowers 
who received these loans typically had unstable incomes, limited savings, unstable employments, 
low incomes, blemished credit and/or high levels of debt. Subprime lenders charge higher 
interest rates to offset the higher risk of their borrowers compared with prime loan borrowers.  
 
Between 1994 and 2004, 80 percent of subprime loans were refinance loans, not home purchase 
loans. Despite broad conceptions to the contrary, subprime loans during this period rarely helped 
to promote homeownership for “difficult to serve” borrowers, but were used mostly to help 
existing low-income and minority homeowners to access equity in their homes. It was only after 
2005 that any significant share of subprime loans was used for purchase—which helped to 
exacerbate speculative pressure on housing markets. In other words, subprime loans did not help 
to fuel the major expansion of homeownership that took place from 1994-2004 as many now 
claim. This expansion in homeownership was done primarily by Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA) lenders, state housing finance agencies, targeted programs subsidized by state and federal 
governments and others providing affordable loans to low- and moderate-income households. 
From 2004-2006, when homeownership rates were falling, the share of subprime loans grew in 
the purchase market.8 
 
Accessing new sources of capital provided by Wall Street firms (Collateralized Debt 
Obligations–sophisticated and risky securities backed by subprime mortgages), subprime lenders 
typically used independent mortgage brokers as their sales force to aggressively originate loans 
with loose credit standards to consumers—sometimes using risky, high-cost and so-called 
“exotic mortgage” products [See “Nightmare Mortgages” in Appendix A, page 33, for more 
details.] Subprime lenders were generally not regulated by federal and state banking regulators. 
Thus, their share of the mortgage market quickly rose from virtually nothing in 1996 to almost 
23 percent by 2006 through using “push marketing” tactics with unsuspecting consumers, 
employing predatory practices or even fraud to entice consumers.9   
 
Consumers were not wholly without fault either. Some used their homes as ATM machines by 
refinancing repeatedly (often paying high interest rates, high fees and prepayment penalties to 
subprime lenders) to pull equity out of their homes for cars, second homes and other consumer 
goods and services. They became increasingly buried in unsustainable debt. Others purchased 
homes as speculative investments with mortgage payments they couldn’t afford, knowingly or 
                                                 
8
 Ellen Schloemer, Wei Li, Keith Ernst, and Kathleen Keest, Losing Ground: Foreclosures in the Subprime Market 
and Their Cost to Homeowners, Center for Responsible Lending. December 2006.  www.responsiblelending.org.  
Also, conversations with George McCarthy, program officer, Ford Foundation, May 2008.  
9
 Ibid. 
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unknowingly, with little or no down payments, apparently assuming that housing prices would 
continue to appreciate forever and they could sell or refinance the home if they stumbled 
financially. This “Wild, Wild West” of lending worked for a while, or at least as long as housing 
values continued to appreciate in many markets. An environment with interest rates at 40-year 
lows helped sustain this home mortgage frenzy until 2006. All the while, federal and state bank 
regulators appeared to be “asleep at the switch” or, at the least, very slow to react to the growing 
risks of this new lending environment. 
 
“Loans were sold to customers where there was no opportunity to succeed,” said Thomas P. 
FitzGibbon, Jr., executive vice president of MB Financial Bank, who testified before the U.S. 
House of Representatives in March 2007 on “the unscrupulous and in many cases, predatory 
practices imbedded in the mortgage lending delivery system. All the brokers thought they were 
on this train to nirvana,” he said. “There was no oversight or control, and no suitability 
evaluation of borrowers.” 
 
While “hot spot” pockets of foreclosures existed in the Midwest (Ohio, Indiana, Michigan) and 
elsewhere starting in 2003, the larger crisis started in 2006 when housing values in the previous “hot 
markets” of California, Nevada, Arizona and Florida began to cool off rapidly. Suddenly, home prices 
in these areas started plummeting and unsold housing inventories swelled. Between the fourth quarter 
of 2005 and the fourth quarter of 2007, existing home sales had plunged 29 percent nationwide and 
even higher in several states. For example, during this same period, existing home sales dropped 65 
percent in Nevada, 57 percent in Arizona, 52 percent in Florida, 48 percent in Maryland and 45 
percent in California.10  Inevitably, 2007 home sale prices dropped more than 4 percent in California  
(-6.6 percent), Nevada (-5.9 percent), Florida (-4.7 percent) and Michigan (-4.3 percent).11  
                                                 
10
 National Association of Realtors. www.nar.com. 
11
 Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Fourth Quarter 2007 data. www.ofheo.gov. 
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By the end of 2007, housing inventories in just five states (FL, CA, MI, OH and GA) accounted for 49 
percent of the country’s unsold inventory.12   
 
                                                 
12
 U.S. Bureau of Census, Fourth Quarter 2007 data. www.census.gov. 
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The softening of the housing market has created economic havoc for homeowners with little or no 
equity. Where previously these homeowners had been able to refinance or sell the property due to the 
rapid appreciation of their homes’ values, now they were being squeezed by falling values, a weak 
economy and high mortgage payments. Thus, loan delinquencies and defaults surged. 
 
According to Moody’s Economy.com, more than 8.8 million borrowers had mortgages that exceeded 
the value of their homes in the first quarter of 2008, with the number expected to increase to 10.6 
million in the second quarter. “It’s an incredibly bad mix that is causing foreclosures to go skyward,” 
reported Mark Zandi, chief economist of Moody’s Economy.com.13 The pace of price declines has 
continued to accelerate. According to OFHE, in the first quarter of 2008, house prices fell nationally at 
the highest quarterly rate on record while the year-on-year price decline has reached record levels, as 
well.14 
 
While foreclosure rates in the U.S. have historically hovered around one percent of all outstanding 
loans according to the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), foreclosures rates for subprime 
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) and other exotic mortgages are now ten to twenty times greater than 
the foreclosure rates for prime fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs).15  
 
                                                 
13
 Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2008.  
14
 Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, “Decline in Housing Prices Accelerates in First Quarter.” May 
22, 2008. www.ofheo.gov. 
15
 Mortgage Bankers Association. National Delinquency Survey, Fourth Quarter 2007.   
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“In February 2008, U.S. home foreclosure filings jumped 60 percent from a year earlier, and bank 
seizures of foreclosed properties more than doubled,” according to Eugene A. Ludwig, the comptroller 
of the currency from 1993 to 1998. “Two million more families currently stand to lose their homes, 
and more could follow as delinquencies continue to climb.”16 
 
 
 
In one respect, the surprise is that this foreclosure crisis is a surprise to anyone. Housing advocates 
have been screaming about the problems of subprime and predatory lending for more than a decade. 
Moreover, the mortgage industry operates on wild boom and bust cycles, and it’s been a “go-go” 
housing market for more than 15 years. Only a few years after the “dot com bust,” it seems that most 
investors forgot that the ride couldn’t last forever.  
 
A definitive study by the Center for Responsible Lending (CRL)17 of six million subprime mort-
gages made from 1998 through the third quarter of 2006 suggested that 2.2 million of these 
loans—more than one third—will end in foreclosure within the next few years. The loans are 
predicted to fail due to their risky nature, loose underwriting, problematic housing market 
conditions or the vulnerability of the homeowners. The CRL study predicted that “one out of five 
subprime mortgages originated in the past two years [2005–2006] will end in foreclosure” and 
“will cost homeowners as much as $164 billion.” Since a disproportionately large share of 
subprime loans were provided to African American and Latino homeowners, the study suggests 
that these projected losses in home equity will distress these minority communities greatly over 
the course of the next few years. 
                                                 
16
 American Banker. April 4, 2008. 
17
 “Losing Ground: Foreclosures in the Subprime Market and Their Cost to Homeowners,” December 2006. CRL 
updated this analysis in March 2007 and increased the number of projected subprime foreclosures to 2.4 million. 
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According to the MBA, an estimated $1.5 trillion in adjustable-rate mortgages are going to 
“reset” in 2008, and homeowners with these could see a significant increase in their monthly 
mortgage payments. The MBA predicts that this will prompt homeowners to refinance about 
$700 billion worth of those adjustable-rate mortgages. Many in the industry fear that 
homeowners who are unable to refinance these loans or afford the higher monthly mortgage 
payments will be facing delinquency or foreclosure.  
 
Realtytrac.com reports that foreclosure filings in the U.S. were up 57 percent in March 2008  
compared to a year earlier, with the states of Nevada, California, Florida, Arizona, Colorado, 
Georgia, Ohio, Michigan, Massachusetts and Maryland having the highest foreclosure rates.  
 
Foreclosure Inventory, Fourth Quarter 2007 
 
All Loans Prime Loans Subprime Loans FHA Loans 
State % 
State 
Rank State % 
State 
Rank State % 
State 
Rank State % 
State 
Rank 
Ohio 3.88 1 Ohio 1.85 1 Ohio 13.7 1 Michigan 5.49 1 
Indiana 3.53 2 Indiana 1.81 2 Minnesota 12.4 2 Ohio 4.70 2 
Michigan 3.38 3 Florida 1.63 3 Michigan 12.3 3 Indiana 4.13 3 
Florida 3.22 4 Michigan 1.62 4 Rhode Island 12.2 4 Colorado 3.46 4 
Nevada 3.02 5 Nevada 1.33 5 Indiana 11.59 5 Wisconsin 3.11 5 
Illinois 2.50 6 Mississippi 1.27 6 Massachusetts 11.41 6 Illinois 3.03 6 
Rhode Island 2.41 7 Delaware 1.26 7 Florida 11.36 7 New Jersey 2.94 7 
Maine 2.36 8 Iowa 1.19 8 Wisconsin 11.31 8 Massachusetts 2.83 8 
Kentucky 2.32 9 Kentucky 1.17 9 Maine 11.26 9 Iowa 2.81 9 
Wisconsin 2.24 10 Illinois 1.13 10 Illinois 11.09 10 Maine 2.73 10 
U.S. 2.04   U.S. 0.96   U.S. 8.65   U.S. 2.34   
 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey, Fourth Quarter 2007 
 
Meanwhile, there are numerous foreclosure hotspots in cities such as Detroit, Stockton, Las 
Vegas, Riverside, Sacramento, Cleveland, Denver, Atlanta, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Chicago, 
Houston, Dallas, St. Louis, Baltimore and more.  
 
Metropolitan Areas with Highest Foreclosure Rates in 2007 
  
     
Rank  Metropolitan Area 
Foreclosure 
Filings: 2007 
% of 
Households 
% Change 
from 2006 
1 DETROIT/LIVONIA/DEARBORN, MI 72,616 4.9 68 
2 STOCKTON, CA 22,184 4.9 271 
3 LAS VEGAS/PARADISE, NV 59,983 4.2 169 
4 RIVERSIDE/SAN BERNARDINO, CA 102,506 3.8 186 
5 SACRAMENTO, CA 49,532 3.2 273 
6 CLEVELAND/LORAIN/ELYRIA/MENTOR, OH 49,071 3.0 112 
7 BAKERSFIELD, CA 13,682 3.0 245 
8 MIAMI, FL 51,662 2.7 106 
9 DENVER/AURORA, CO 49,519 2.6 28 
10 FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 45,367 2.6 110 
 
Source: RealtyTrac.com 
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The Impacts of Foreclosure 
 
Foreclosures have severe, negative impacts on borrowers, damaging their ability to secure credit 
in the future. Concentration of foreclosed properties can also generate a vicious cycle of 
deterioration in small geographies and impose significant direct and indirect costs on 
communities.  
 
Foreclosures have devastating effects on families.  
Families in foreclosure not only lose their homes, security and stability, but also their home 
equity and their credit rating. It often takes years for a family to recover from a foreclosure. A 
study of families in foreclosures in Minneapolis in 1995 estimated that these families lost, on 
average, more than $7,000 of home equity through the process.18 
 
Foreclosures have costly effects on communities.  
According to a 2005 study by William Apgar and Mark Duda, the foreclosure of a single-family 
home, especially one that leaves the home vacant and unsecured, may generate direct municipal 
costs on cash-strapped public agencies in excess of $30,000 per property. 19   
 
In addition, area homeowners, business owners, and landlords stand to lose if a rash of 
foreclosures brings down property values, accelerating the decline of an entire neighborhood. 
These are called the “contagion effects” of foreclosure. A study by Dan Immergluck and Geoff 
Smith suggests that a nearby foreclosure could reduce a home’s value by 0.9 percent. 20  
 
As the economy and housing market conditions continue to weaken across the country, many 
industry experts predict that foreclosure rates will continue to rise over the next two or more 
years. The CRL recently predicted that 2,258,457 homes will be lost through foreclosure in 2008 
and 2009 alone.21 CRL suggests that each foreclosure has negative effects on the surrounding 
neighborhood, reducing values of surrounding houses by almost $9,000 per home. CRL 
calculates the total potential decrease in home values and tax base across the nation to be $356 
billion unless significant action is taken to address these projected foreclosures. 
 
Foreclosures can ripple through the national and global economy.  
Recent studies by CRL, Moody’s and others suggest that total foreclosures could range up to 
three million in the next few years. “The problems are also spilling over into other sectors, with 
delinquencies rising for credit cards, auto and student loans.” writes Ruth Simon in the Wall 
Street Journal. “A record $715 billion of consumer debt is now in delinquency or default 
according to Equifax and Moody’s Economy.com, up from nearly $300 billion three years 
ago.”22 
                                                 
18
 Anna Moreno, “The Cost of Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention.” Minneapolis: Family Housing Fund, 1995. 
19
 “Collateral Damage: The Municipal Impact of Today's Mortgage Foreclosure Boom.” Homeownership 
Preservation Foundation. May 2005. www.hpfonline.org.  
20
 “The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of Single Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values,” 
Housing Policy Debate, Volume 17, Issue 1. 
21
 “Subprime Spillover.” Center for Responsible Lending. January 18, 2008. 
22
 Wall Street Journal. April 10, 2008. 
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If even a portion of these loans fail, the effects on the nation’s communities and the broader 
economy could be devastating. In an already weakened economy, the last thing the nation needs 
is a spiking foreclosure rate, more vacant inventory thrown into the housing market, and the 
negative spin-off on consumers’ confidence.  
 
The High Cost of Foreclosures 23 
Stakeholders 
Estimated Cost 
per 
Foreclosure 
 
Source/Basis: 
Homeowner $7,200 
Anna Moreno, “The Cost of Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention.” 
Minneapolis: Family Housing Fund, 1995 
 
Lender/Servicer $50,000 
Desiree Hatcher, ”Foreclosure Alternatives: A Case for 
Preserving Homeownership.” Profitwise News and Views, 
February 2006 
 
Local Government $19,227 
Estimate assumes property is abandoned before foreclosure is 
completed. William C. Apgar and Mark Duda, “Collateral Damage: 
The Municipal Impact of Today's Foreclosure Boom.” 
Homeownership Preservation Foundation, May 2005. 
 
Adjacent Neighbors’ 
Home Values $3,016 
Assumes two adjacent homes each experiencing a 0.9 percent 
home-price depreciation based on the national median home 
price of $167,500 as of 2005. Census Bureau, 2005 American 
Community Survey. Dan Immergluck and Geoff Smith, “The 
External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of Single-Family 
Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values.” Housing Policy 
Debate, 17(1). 
 
 
Estimated Total 
Cost of Foreclosures 
 
$79,443    
                                                 
23
 “Sheltering Neighborhoods from the Subprime Foreclosure Storm,” Special Report from the Joint Economic 
Committee. April 2007. 
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Recent Developments24 
 
Hope Now Alliance 
The Hope Now Alliance is a national collaboration of foreclosure intervention counselors, 
lenders, investors and other mortgage market participants announced in October 2007. Key 
members of the Hope Now Alliance consist of 27 mortgage servicers (representing 90 percent of 
the subprime lending market) and nonprofits such as NeighborWorks America, the 
Homeownership Preservation Foundation, and the Housing Partnership Network. The Alliance, 
which is dedicated to reaching more homeowners facing foreclosure through coordinated 
national public awareness efforts and local homeowner outreach events, has been supported by 
President Bush, Treasury Secretary Paulson, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), and many members of Congress. 
 
With a goal of accelerating contact and relief for homeowners, Hope Now Alliance members 
agree to:  
 
• Attempt to contact at-risk borrowers 120 days (or less) prior to the initial Adjustable Rate 
Mortgage (ARM) reset on all 2/28 and 3/27 loan products (see appendix for descriptions); 
 
• Inform borrowers of the potential increase in payment and terms of the loan; 
 
• Establish a single port of entry for all participating nonprofit counselors to use; and 
 
• Make available dedicated e-mail and fax connections to support counselor and consumer 
contacts. 
 
Two cornerstones of the Alliance are the national hotline, 888-995-HOPE, operated by the 
Homeownership Preservation Foundation and the related national Ad Council public service 
campaign, overseen by NeighborWorks America. The campaign and the hotline directly connect 
homeowners with trained counselors at nonprofit counseling agencies that have been certified by 
HUD. This counseling service is free to homeowners and currently fields more than 4,000 
homeowner calls daily. Currently 450 counselors provide direct financial advice, facilitate 
communication and solutions with servicers, and refer homeowners to local community 
resources. 
 
A key development heavily touted by Hope Now is a loan modification framework created by 
the American Securitization Forum (ASF), which allows servicers to more easily modify certain 
adjustable rate loans securitized in the secondary market. Hope Now members have been using 
the ASF framework to refinance or modify terms for qualified mortgages originated between 
July 1, 2005 and July 31, 2007 that are scheduled to reset between January 1, 2008 and July 31, 
2010. Although the effort is voluntary and the framework has a complex set of qualification 
criteria, relief is being offered with significant interest-rate reductions and/or freezing of 
adjustable rates for up to five years, and thus preventing payment increases. 
                                                 
24
 Responses to the foreclosure crisis have created a rapidly changing landscape of local, regional and national 
efforts.  This briefing paper was written in May 2008 and attempts to highlight those efforts underway up until that 
time. 
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This framework was announced December 6, 2007. Prior to this, Hope Now servicers indicated 
that loan modifications, often the most powerful tool to help a homeowner remain in a home at 
an affordable payment, were outcomes in just 15 percent of cases. These same servicers reported 
a 19 percent increase in the frequency of a loan modification as a solution after the ASF 
framework was announced. Specifically for subprime loans, modifications increased to nearly 50 
percent of loan workouts in January 2008. Also of note, nearly three times as many homeowners 
received a loan workout (including repayment plans, forbearance, loan modifications, etc.) 
compared to the number of completed foreclosure sales. [Refer to Appendix D, page 37, for a 
further explanation of these workout options.] 
 
As impressive as these trends are, only 278,000 homeowners received a loan modification from 
their Hope Now servicers between July 1, 2007, and January 31, 2008. Critics say that although 
the ASF framework and the efforts of Hope Now are helping some homeowners, many of the 
most troubled homeowners do not meet the qualification criteria, still have limited options to 
avoid foreclosure and thus, remain at risk.25 
 
As of April 1, 2008 all Hope Now servicers have also adopted the principles of Project Lifeline, 
which is an effort to reach their most at-risk borrowers (90-day plus delinquencies). Project 
Lifeline essentially offers a 30-day “pause” in the foreclosure process, allowing more time to 
review the homeowner’s financials, communicate with a counselor, and possibly negotiate a loan 
modification. 
 
National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program 
This $180-million program was initiated in December 2007 with funds appropriated by Congress 
to increase the availability and quality of foreclosure counseling services across the country. The 
funding was administered by NeighborWorks America to support foreclosure counseling 
services as well as to train foreclosure counselors through national and regional training events in 
partnership with other national, regional and state agencies.  
 
On February 26, 2008, NeighborWorks America announced $130 million in funding awards to 
32 State Housing Finance Agencies (HFAs), 16 HUD-approved Housing Counseling 
Intermediaries, and 82 community-based NeighborWorks organizations, to provide counseling to 
families and individuals facing the threat of foreclosure. NeighborWorks America estimates that 
350,000 to 400,000 families will be directly assisted through these grant funds, which support 
nonprofit homeowner outreach and counseling programs.  
 
All funds must be spent by the end of 2008, thus accelerating the national response in the midst 
of the crisis. It is important to note that these federal funds are narrowly prescribed, as well, only 
covering direct provision of counseling services—and not being made available to build long-
term counseling capacity. This is important because local nonprofits will need the support of 
other funders to invest in building long-term counseling capacity. 
                                                 
25
 A recent report from CRL suggested that only 150,000 borrowers would qualify for assistance, given the narrow 
guidelines suggested by Treasury and the Hope Now Alliance. 
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FHA Secure 
A new FHA loan program was launched August 31, 2007, with the support of President Bush.  
At that time, FHA projected the loan program would help about 250,000 homeowners through 
2008. FHA Secure provides foreclosure relief specifically for homeowners affected by rising 
interest rates on adjustable rate loans, by offering a new, federally-insured loan at a lower fixed 
rate.  Some of the qualification criteria include steady payment history prior to any rate reset on 
the existing mortgage and meeting FHA guidelines for loan-to-value (with a maximum of 97 
percent).   
 
Previously, FHA loan limits prevented many homeowners from qualifying for FHA Secure in 
high-cost housing markets. However, effective March 6, 2008, HUD temporarily raised the FHA 
loan limit from $271,050 to $729,750, in order to expand the reach of FHA products into more 
expensive housing markets, many of which are experiencing severe foreclosure problems. 
 
However, current underwriting guidelines continue to limit the impact of FHA Secure. Reports 
vary widely on how many homeowners have qualified and received an FHA Secure loan. Some 
say only a few thousand loans have closed, but FHA reported February 1, 2008, that it has been 
able to assist more than 76,000 Americans to date and projects a total of 300,000 will qualify by 
the end of the year. Regardless, in light of the escalating foreclosure crisis, it is clear that the 
number of borrowers helped by FHA Secure is small compared to the millions of homeowners 
with adjustable rate mortgages that are, or soon will become, unaffordable and thus face the 
threat of foreclosure. 
 
The program, as currently designed, is set to expire at the end of 2008. Various proposals being 
considered by Congress (highlighted later in this report) include a significant expansion of this 
FHA loan program, through loosening of underwriting guidelines and other changes, potentially 
allowing more homeowners in distress to qualify. 
 
A little-known cost of foreclosure is the tax implication for homeowners who lose their homes.  
Debt that is forgiven in the foreclosure process is customarily treated as income by the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS). The Mortgage Debt Relief Act, signed into law in December 2007, helps 
address this issue. This law provides an exception (available for the 2007, 2008, and 2009 tax 
years) that allows debt forgiveness on home loans by helping families already unable to meet 
their mortgage obligations to avoid incurring large income tax bills. The Act amends the IRS 
code to exclude from gross income amounts attributed to a discharge of indebtedness incurred to 
acquire a principle residence. 
 
Although this change to the IRS code does not directly reduce the number of foreclosures, it does 
provide some relief to homeowners who were foreclosed, or who were forced to sell their home 
for less than the full loan balance. Additionally, this provision protects the homeowner from a 
possible income tax liability if the servicer forgives some of the principal loan balance in a loan 
modification, a practice that may be increasingly common in depreciating housing markets. 
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State-Sponsored Foreclosure Intervention Programs26  
 
States across the country have been actively responding to the needs of their citizens, developing 
programs and passing legislation to address the crisis. As the impact of foreclosures continues to 
grow, the number of states responding formally, as well as the depth of their response and 
intervention, continues to increase. Many governors and state-led task forces are exploring 
options for keeping families in their homes, but also for dealing with recovery and rebuilding 
efforts to stabilize communities severely hit by large-scale foreclosure losses. 
 
Many states have implemented organized multifaceted responses, as well as approved new 
legislation designed to deal with the impacts of foreclosure in their communities. Although the 
responses vary greatly between states, and continue to evolve daily with many state legislative 
bodies currently in session, the solutions being deployed generally fall into one of four 
categories: prevention, intervention, financing and stabilization. 
 
Prevention Strategies 
At least 30 states have taken action to stop practices that have contributed to the current crisis, by 
reducing the number of high-risk and predatory loans originated through stricter regulation of 
mortgage products and the origination process as well as better consumer education. By banning 
common predatory practices and adopting regulatory guidelines for subprime and nontraditional 
mortgage products, states expect to limit the number of homeowners being placed into high-risk 
or even illegal loans. Some states have tightened regulation of mortgage brokers and/or loan 
originators. Other states have substantially increased criminal penalties for mortgage fraud by 
enforcing existing lending laws, increasing funding for supervision, and pursuing violators. 
Several examples of new state legislation are listed below.  
 
Massachusetts 
In November 2007, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick signed a new law that provides the 
Division of Banks (DOB) with $3 million to increase regulation of the state’s mortgage lending 
industry and to maintain a detailed database of the state’s foreclosures. The DOB will also 
provide $2 million in grants to fund first-time homebuyer counseling and create ten regional 
foreclosure prevention centers.  
 
Mortgage loan originators, including nonprofit lenders, are required to be licensed. Lenders will 
be rated on their ability to assist low- and moderate-income residents, ensuring that rates and 
terms for such applicants are consistent with similar applicants. Inability to receive positive 
ratings under this monitoring system may result in denial of a license by the DOB. In order to be 
licensed by the DOB, the originator must pass a background check, take a residential mortgage 
lending course, and complete eight hours of continuing education requirements every three years. 
 
Minnesota 
In May 2007, Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty signed a law to strengthen consumer 
protections against predatory lending practices. The legislation gives borrowers recourse to bring 
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 Based on research in “Defaulting on the Dream: States Respond to America’s Foreclosure Crisis” by the Pew 
Charitable Trust.  April 2008. www.pewtrusts.org. “State Policy Responses to Foreclosure: 2008.” PolicyLab 
Consulting Group, LLC. Pew Center on the States.  Also, “State Strategies to Address Foreclosures,” by the  
National Governors Association. September 19, 2007.  www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0709foreclosures.pdf.  
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lawsuits against predatory lenders and collect attorney’s fees if they win their suit. Specific 
provisions of the bill require lenders to originate adjustable loans only if the borrower can afford 
the future adjusted payments.  
 
Intervention Strategies 
Many states have strengthened support for direct help to homeowners through various counseling 
and education efforts. Research and experience both show that even after foreclosure 
proceedings have begun, foreclosures can often be averted. However, most homeowners in 
distress are unaware of the options available to them. Many states have taken steps to expand 
awareness of those available options and to connect homeowners to local or national counseling 
services. In addition to counseling, some states are taking actions to protect consumers from 
foreclosure “rescue” scams27 and passing laws that slow the foreclosure process, allowing more 
time for homeowners to recover or sell their home at fair market value. Examples include:   
 
Minnesota  
The Minnesota Housing Finance Agency (MHFA), the Minnesota Home Ownership Center and 
20 nonprofit agencies provide counseling and loan funds to prevent mortgage foreclosure as part 
of the Foreclosure Prevention Assistance Program (FPAP). In late 2007, with the support of state 
funding, these agencies were able to increase the number of foreclosure counselors in the state 
from 23 to 40. Subsequently, national grant funds increased the number of available counselors 
to 77. Delinquent homeowners receive financial and debt-management counseling, help 
negotiating with servicers, and, in some cases, access to zero percent emergency loans for up to 
$5,500 to bring the mortgage current or to help the homeowner qualify for an affordable loan 
workout.  
 
Illinois 
Illinois passed the Mortgage Rescue Fraud Act in June 2006 to protect troubled borrowers from 
fraudulent foreclosure rescue scams. The law requires that any person who seeks to assist a 
homeowner at risk of foreclosure fully disclose in writing the terms and associated costs of the 
service, and a right of rescission. The law also gives troubled homeowners the option to cancel 
services with a mortgage rescuer at any time. Any sale completed through a rescue service must 
be close to the home’s appraised value and violators are subject to criminal liability. 
 
Ohio 
Ohio Governor Ted Strickland announced that nine subprime servicers had agreed to a “Compact 
to Help Ohioans Preserve Homeownership” on April 7, 2008. Among other provisions, loan 
servicers agreed to: a) engage in large-scale loan modification efforts for homeowners; b) create 
incentives for staff and foreclosure departments to modify loans rather than foreclose; and c) 
report progress on these efforts to the Ohio Department of Commerce until June 30, 2009. 
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 The rise in foreclosures has also created new businesses that prey on stressed-out borrowers facing foreclosure. 
These predatory businesses often masquerade as nonprofit credit counseling agencies offering to help troubled 
borrowers.  Instead, these organizations typically extract large payments from unwitting borrowers in distress or find 
ways to take possession of their homes in exchange for providing little or no valuable services. 
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Financing Strategies 
Many states are creating both refinance and rescue “bridge” loan programs, intended to help 
homeowners recover and continue to pay their existing mortgage, or to qualify for state- 
sponsored refinance products at affordable fixed rates. Although the reach of such funds is 
limited, and many homeowners are having trouble meeting underwriting guidelines due to the 
condition of their credit, unstable income, or declining equity position, several states have 
achieved some success. Several examples include:  
 
Ohio 
Ohio launched the “Opportunity Loan Refinance Program” in April 2007 to help borrowers 
refinance high-cost subprime loans. The loan program allows lenders to originate fixed-rate 
loans for eligible borrowers that are purchased by the Ohio Housing Finance Agency (OHFA) 
using taxable bonds. To fund the program, $100 million in taxable bonds were allocated. 
Implementing a recommendation by the Ohio Foreclosure Prevention Task force, OHFA 
expanded its underwriting criteria for the loan program in September 2007 to allow more 
homeowners to qualify. Unfortunately, due to strict underwriting criteria, the number of 
refinance loans approved for this program has been very low to date. 
 
New York 
New York’s “Keep the Dream Alive” program was launched in July 2007. With $100 million 
available to help families refinance out of high-risk loans, the State of New York Mortgage 
Agency (SONYMA) intends to help families transition into affordable, low-interest loans that 
will increase the likelihood of avoiding foreclosure. Those with interest-only, adjustable rate, or 
other unconventional loan terms are being targeted for the program. Borrowers must receive 
homeownership counseling from approved housing counseling agencies prior to loan approval. 
As in Ohio, critics initially felt not enough homeowners would meet the underwriting guidelines. 
Thus, in December 2007, eligibility was expanded to: 1) include owners of two-, three- and four-
family homes in addition to single-family homes, condos and co-ops; and 2) allow lower FICO 
credit scores.  Nonetheless, as of April 2008, less than five loans have been approved through the 
“Keep the Dream Alive” program according to state officials. 
 
Massachusetts 
MassHousing’s HomeSaver Foreclosure Prevention Program in Massachusetts is now offering 
$250 million in fixed-interest rate refinancing loans and counseling services to struggling 
subprime borrowers. The program is privately financed through a $190 million commitment 
from Fannie Mae and a $60 million contribution from MassHousing. Among other qualifying 
criteria, counseling is mandatory and a homeowner cannot be more than 60 days late on their 
current mortgage payment. Once again, according to state officials, few loans have been 
approved to date due to strict underwriting criteria and declining home values. 
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Stabilization Strategies 
Stabilization programs are designed to mitigate the harm of vacant foreclosed homes by 
facilitating the process of rehabilitating those homes and returning them to the affordable 
housing market. Although this area of work is less developed than other strategies, some states 
are taking a leadership role in helping city and nonprofit leaders develop programs in areas of 
high foreclosure in order to stabilize affected neighborhoods in the wake of the crisis.  
 
Massachusetts 
In October 2007, Governor Patrick announced a Neighborhood Stabilization Pilot Program 
launched in the cities of Lawrence, Boston, Brockton, New Bedford, Springfield and Worcester. 
The Department of Housing and Community Development, working with lenders and nonprofits, 
will seek to reclaim foreclosed properties and make them available to qualified first-time 
homebuyers with the goal of restoring neighborhoods to fully occupied status as quickly as 
possible.  
 
Additionally, the Massachusetts plan calls for participating lenders to provide moving expenses 
and first and last month’s rent to eligible homeowners who have lost their homes to foreclosure. 
Eligible homeowners include those in an owner-occupied home with a subprime adjustable-rate 
mortgage that originated in 2004, 2005, or 2006, who have been foreclosed on within four years 
after the loan closing. Homeowners must also work with an approved housing counselor, fully 
vacate the property within 30 days of foreclosure, and leave it in habitable condition.  
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Federal Proposals to Address the Mortgage Crisis 28–29 
 
U.S. Congress 
After months of bipartisan debate and disagreement on the nature and extent of any federal 
intervention into the current housing and mortgage crisis, a comprehensive bill appears to have 
secured momentum and Senate support from both Democrats and Republicans.  Although 
lingering differences between the House and Senate versions of the bill need to be ironed out 
before final passage, a bipartisan $15 billon housing relief package could go for a final vote in 
the spring of 2008. Election year pressures, as well as the ripple effect the housing market and 
general credit crunch are having on the overall economy, have motivated both parties to 
compromise on several key issues. Additionally, there is broad consensus that it pays to prevent 
foreclosures. When costs to homeowners, loan servicers, investors, lenders, neighbors, and local 
governments are added up, every home foreclosure can cost stakeholders more than $80,000. 
 
The current Senate bill contains the following key provisions to address the housing crisis: 
 
Homeowner Intervention Provisions 
 
1. Modernize FHA: The bill would change the FHA’s insured loan program, which can 
help homeowners with adjustable rate loans refinance into a fixed rate FHA product. The 
bill would raise the FHA loan limits to 110 percent (from 95 percent) of the median home 
price, with a dollar cap of $550,000. The old loan limit was $271,050, preventing most 
homeowners in higher-cost markets from considering an FHA product. The Senate 
version of the bill requires an increase in required down payment funds from 3 percent to 
3.5 percent, although the House may not support this increase. 
 
2. Mortgage Revenue Bonds for State Housing Finance Agencies: The bill permits states 
to create $10 billion in tax-free municipal bonds, which would be used for loan products 
to refinance subprime homeowners into lower, fixed-rate mortgages. Under current law, 
tax-free bonds can be used only for first-time homebuyer loan programs or to support 
redevelopment in target areas.    
 
3. Additional Funding for Foreclosure Counselors: The current bill calls for an 
additional $100 million to support the nonprofit housing counselors who work with 
homeowners in default across the country. Currently counseling organizations, typically 
overseen through national HUD intermediaries or state housing finance agencies, are 
overwhelmed by homeowners seeking assistance. The additional funds would provide 
services to several hundred thousand more homeowners in trouble. 
 
4. Clearer Disclosures: The bill may include guidelines or regulations for improved 
disclosures during the loan application process, so consumers can better understand the 
documents they are signing, including simple explanations of potential payment increases 
in adjustable-rate mortgages. 
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 Partially based on research from “Addressing the Foreclosure Crisis: State and Federal Initiatives in 
Massachusetts.” Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association (CHAPA) Briefing Paper. March 2008. 
29
 Responses to the foreclosure crisis have created a rapidly changing landscape of local, regional and national 
efforts.  This briefing paper was written in May 2008 and attempts to highlight those efforts underway up until that 
time. 
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Tax Relief Provisions: 
 
1. Property Tax Deduction for Homeowners: For the 28 million homeowners who 
take the standard deduction each year, the proposed bill would permit a new property 
tax deduction of $500 for single filers and $1,000 for couples. Currently only 
homeowners who itemize can deduct their property taxes from their taxable income. 
 
2. Tax Credits for Buyers of Distressed Homes: A new tax credit of up to $7,000 
would be provided to buyers of properties in default or foreclosure. This incentive is 
intended to be a catalyst for the housing market. 
 
3. Tax Breaks for Homebuilders: The most controversial piece of the bill contains an 
expansion of when the net operating losses are applied to corporate tax bills. The 
proposed legislation would extend to four years (from two years) the time a 
homebuilder may apply its 2008 and 2009 losses to past tax bills. Supporters say it 
will keep homebuilders of all sizes operational during this downturn, thus preserving 
thousands of construction-related jobs. 
 
What’s Being Left Out? 
Critics of the Senate bill argue it does more for businesses and lenders than for homeowners. The 
House bill will likely differ significantly on several key points and place more emphasis on 
funding directed to help defaulting homeowners in more direct ways. 
Several key items proposed by leading Democrats are currently not included in the Senate bill. 
These include a measure that would allow bankruptcy judges to reduce the principal balances on 
home mortgages for homeowners in bankruptcy. This provision is supported by housing 
advocates, who say it could keep up to 600,000 homeowners out of foreclosure.30 Supporters 
also claim it would not encourage more homeowners to file for bankruptcy, but rather create an 
added incentive for lenders and servicers to modify the terms of more distressed, subprime 
mortgages. Opponents argue that the provision would actually raise mortgage interest rates as 
lenders would price products higher to account for the chance that a third party (the bankruptcy 
courts) may change interest rates or forgive principal. One possible compromise being 
considered is allowing bankruptcy courts to only reduce the interest rate on the mortgage, but not 
reduce the loan balance. 
 
Another provision missing from the proposed bill, but still being considered, would allow the 
FHA to insure up to $600 billion in troubled loans, if lenders and investors agreed to reduce loan 
balances. The intent of this plan would be to make the mortgages more affordable (due to lower 
principal balances and fixed-interest rates) to homeowners and then insure them through FHA. 
This also allows the lenders and servicers to unload poorly performing loans from their 
portfolios. One version of the proposal offered by Financial Services Committee chair Barney 
Frank (D-MA) would require mortgage investors and lenders to write-down the loan balance to 
qualify for having their loans prepaid by the government. The FHA would guarantee the existing 
lender no more than 85 percent of the property’s current value.  In turn, the FHA would require 
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 Congressional testimony by the Center for Responsible Lending. www.responsiblelending.org/policy/congress 
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that the mortgage to the homeowner be set at 90 percent of the appraised value, leaving 5 percent 
for FHA to help protect against losses. 
Supporters say this plan is good for all parties. Homeowners would have a better chance of 
remaining in their homes with lower monthly mortgage payments due to more reasonable, fixed-
interest rates, as well as having a stronger equity position in their homes because of less overall 
mortgage debt. Cities would not see as much potential damage and tax revenue loss from the 
negative impacts of foreclosure. Housing prices would stabilize as the overall housing market 
and economy began to recover. Although lenders take a loss, the losses may be lower than if 
homes went into foreclosure, which can result in losses of 50 percent or more of the outstanding 
mortgage. Opponents to such a plan argue it will only prolong the “credit crunch” and could 
delay a revival in the housing market.  
Current Proposals of the Presidential Candidates 
All three presidential candidates (Clinton, McCain and Obama) have formally offered their own 
solutions and proposals for the housing and mortgage crisis. Although these plans vary in detail 
and focus, each of them would likely be reshaped if the current proposal being considered by 
Congress passes. Proposals from Clinton (previous to her exit from the presidential race) and 
Obama contain many of the same key elements. What follows is a brief summation of the key 
points of each candidate. 
 
Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY)  
Senator Clinton outlined a four-step plan to address the negative impacts of foreclosure on 
homeowners and other stakeholders. Aside from supporting the (previously reviewed) legislation 
proposed by Rep. Barney Frank and Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT), Senator Clinton supports 
the creation of an Emergency Working Group on Foreclosures composed of non-partisan 
economic leaders. This group would recommend ways that FHA and other government-
sponsored enterprises could best be used to address the problem. 
Senator Clinton’s plan also called for a 90-day moratorium on foreclosures back in December 
2007. It is unclear if she would have asked for a similar moratorium if she were elected 
president.  She also proposed a new housing stimulus package to provide $30 billion directly to 
states and localities hardest hit by the housing and subprime crisis. The funds could be used to 
purchase distressed properties that cities and states could then convert to affordable rental 
housing or resell to low-income families, as well as to provide additional funding for consumer 
counseling. The final piece of her plan would involve new legislation to provide mortgage 
companies with protection, when they modify terms of distressed mortgages, against lawsuits by 
the investment banks, private equity firms and other investors in these mortgages. 
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Senator John McCain (R-AZ) 
Senator McCain has also outlined his proposed solution to the housing and credit situation. He 
restated his belief that the blame for the current crisis rests in four areas: 
1. Housing investors who overwhelmed normal market forces with rampant speculation.  
2. Lenders who became complacent because of rising home prices and consequently failed 
to maintain their lending standards.  
3. The explosion of complex financial instruments that were not well understood by most 
investors.   
4. A crisis of confidence arising from recent losses that has caused banks to no longer trust 
each other and for credit to dry up.  
Senator McCain has said that no assistance should be given to speculators and that any aid given 
should be limited to homeowners (and only their primary residences), must be temporary, and 
must not reward people who were irresponsible at the expense of those who were not. 
His most specific proposals include: 
1. Reforms to the system including increased transparency and accountability. Homeowners 
should be able to easily understand the terms of their mortgages and, in return, should 
provide truthful financial information in loan documents and be subject to a penalty if 
they do not.  
2. Lenders should be held accountable for the quality and performance of those loans and 
strict standards should be required in the lending process.  
3. The down payment requirements for FHA mortgages should be raised.  
4. Financial institutions should be encouraged to increase capital reserves to serve as a 
buffer against losses by removing regulatory, accounting and tax impediments to raising 
capital.  
Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) 
Senator Obama’s plan to address the housing and foreclosure crisis includes three major 
components: 1) Modernizing the financial regulatory system; 2) Helping homeowners facing 
foreclosure and easing the credit crunch; and 3) enacting a second $30 billion stimulus package 
specific to the mortgage crisis, including $10 billion for a foreclosure prevention fund to help 
Americans keep their homes.  
 
Modernizing the Financial Regulatory System  
Obama’s plan would accomplish this by using a variety of reform principles, including: 
1. Provide the Federal Reserve with basic supervisory authority over any financial 
institution to which it makes credit available as a lender of last resort.  
2. Capital, liquidity and disclosure requirements should be developed and strengthened for 
all financial institutions, along with examination and reform of credit rating companies.  
3. The system must simplified and be capable of identifying where risks reside in the 
system.  
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Helping Homeowners Facing Foreclosure and Easing the Credit Crunch 
Senator Obama’s plan offers numerous options to assist homeowners. In most aspects, his plan is 
similar in design to the plan of Rep. Frank and Senator Dodd currently being considered by 
Congress.  
 
Mortgage Crisis Stimulus Package 
The first $10 billion of Obama’s stimulus proposed package is targeted toward increasing 
counseling resources and providing low-income homeowners additional time and support to pay 
back any losses from the sale of their home. The package would also allow the federal 
government to partner with state governments, local organizations, and lenders to ensure that 
loan modifications can be made in a timely manner and thus reduce foreclosures or bankruptcies.  
A second $10 billion would be used to assist state and local governments that are facing revenue 
shortfalls because of the housing crisis and economy. This fund would help limit the need for 
governments to reduce critical public services and infrastructure spending due to declining 
property tax revenues. 
Finally, Senator Obama’s plan calls for an extension of unemployment benefits to workers who 
have exhausted their current eligibility and extend eligibility to more workers, including many 
part-time and other workers, who are not currently included in the system. 
 
 
   
26 
Case Studies of Foreclosure Intervention Programs  
 
Innovations for preventing foreclosures are being developed and tested in many communities. 
The strongest initiatives involve collaborations of public, private and nonprofit institutions. Here 
are some examples of these collaborations. 
 
The Home Ownership Preservation Initiative in Chicago 
Significant work on this issue was pioneered by Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago 
(NHS of Chicago) starting in 2003. NHS of Chicago, in partnership with the city of Chicago and 
leading mortgage lending and servicing institutions, piloted a new model for homeownership 
preservation activities. Facing a rising number of both conventional and subprime foreclosures 
concentrated in low-income and minority neighborhoods, NHS of Chicago developed the Home 
Ownership Preservation Initiative (HOPI). The HOPI partners are working to help homeowners 
avoid foreclosures with innovative outreach efforts, delinquency counseling, loss mitigation and 
loan workouts. Through this effort, NHS of Chicago has helped more than 1,300 families 
throughout the past three years to preserve homeownership. When foreclosure is unavoidable, 
the partners seek to preserve the properties as neighborhood assets. Innovations coming out of 
HOPI include a city-run 311 hotline to connect troubled borrowers to phone counseling; research 
on foreclosure-related issues; and an advisory committee with industry-led workgroups 
investigating further innovations. 
 
National HOPE Hotline for Troubled Borrowers 
The Homeownership Preservation Foundation, a Minneapolis-based national nonprofit dedicated 
to preserving homeownership and preventing home foreclosures, operates the national HOPE 
Hotline at 888-995-HOPE. This toll-free hotline offers free foreclosure-prevention counseling to 
troubled borrowers. The telephone-based counselors working on the HOPE Hotline are available 
24 hours a day and seven days a week. More than 450 counselors provide services for the HOPE 
Hotline in English and Spanish. The counselors work for five nonprofit agencies, all of which are 
HUD-certified. So far in 2008, the HOPE Hotline is receiving more than 4,000 calls a day from 
troubled homeowners. Twenty-five percent of these calls resulted in workout plans to help the 
families avoid foreclosure. The telephone counselors also make referrals to local counselors for 
face-to-face follow-up counseling services. The HOPE hotline has proven to be very cost-
effective in reaching consumers who might otherwise ignore their mortgage delinquency 
problems until it’s too late. 
 
The NeighborWorks® Center for Foreclosure Solutions 
The NeighborWorks® Center for Foreclosure Solutions (CFS), an initiative of NeighborWorks® 
America, was created in 2005 to preserve homeownership in the face of rising foreclosure rates. 
In conjunction with key partners, including other nonprofit organizations, foundations, mortgage 
and insurance partners, the center builds capacity among foreclosure counselors around the 
nation, conducts public outreach campaigns to reach struggling homeowners, and researches 
local and national trends to develop strategic solutions. In cities and states with high rates of 
foreclosure, the center works with local leaders and nonprofit organizations to create sustainable 
foreclosure-intervention programs.  
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Ad Council Campaign on Foreclosure Prevention 
As part of its outreach efforts, in June 2007 NeighborWorks® America launched a national 
foreclosure-prevention advertising campaign in partnership with the Ad Council and many other 
industry partners. The campaign directs struggling borrowers to call the HOPE hotline, where 
they will receive high-quality counseling and be connected with their lender or a local 
foreclosure counselor. The campaign includes TV, radio, newspaper, magazine, Web and 
outdoor advertising. Marketing material templates are available to local organizations to use and 
co-brand. The campaign was launched nationally in June 2007 with a special focus on areas with 
high rates of foreclosure. To date, 24 business partners have provided financial support to this 
campaign.  
 
ACORN’s Efforts on Negotiating Loan Modifications 
According to ACORN’s Director of Housing Counseling Bruce Dorpalen, “ACORN Housing is 
working with 36 mortgage servicers, prime and subprime, to negotiate loan workouts and 
payment agreements.” ACORN has teams of community workers visiting people facing 
foreclosure in Ohio, Michigan, Texas and Louisiana, and connecting them to counselors or 
directly to their lenders. Team members try to negotiate affordable loan modifications, because 
many of their clients cannot qualify for refinances of their mortgages. In addition, continues 
Dorpalen, “ACORN and ACORN Housing have been working with servicers to set up best 
practices which reduce foreclosures, preserve the wealth of low- and moderate-income 
homeowners, and curb predatory lending practices.” 
 
Early Intervention Foreclosure-Prevention Outreach and Workshops 
Some localities have had success developing and delivering foreclosure-prevention workshops in 
communities suffering high delinquency and foreclosure rates. These workshops have been most 
effective when delivered in cooperation with lenders who help provide targeted outreach to 
consumers in the early stages of delinquency. In Chicago, these workshops have also been used 
with borrowers with ARMs to help provide them with advance information about the potential 
effect on their mortgage payment after an interest-rate reset occurs. In a more advanced version 
of this strategy, Consumer Credit Counseling Service of San Francisco (CCCS-SF) and Self-
Help Credit Union have had great success providing early-intervention, telephone-based 
counseling to new borrowers to prepare them for the responsibilities of homeownership and to 
stress the importance of making timely mortgage payments. 
 
A Statewide Foreclosure-Prevention Initiative in Ohio 
For the past six years, the state of Ohio has had one of the highest foreclosure rates in the country 
causing untold harm to families and communities across the state. Starting in 2005,  nonprofit 
organizations in Ohio formed a statewide coalition to share best practices, align efforts and 
leverage their strategic partnerships to achieve a common goal of reducing foreclosures among 
low- and moderate-income families across Ohio. In 2006, the state Office of Housing and 
Community Partnerships funded this initiative with a three-year, $3 million commitment to do 
statewide outreach to consumers, promote a 24/7 hotline for telephone-based counseling to 
consumers, expand local counseling services for foreclosure prevention, and offer small grants 
(up to $3,000) to assist homeowners in foreclosure with “home rescue” funds. A statewide 
marketing effort was launched to promote the 888-995-HOPE hotline that provides free 
telephonic counseling to consumers facing foreclosures. This outreach campaign produced 
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10,488 calls to the HOPE Hotline from Ohio, with 3,102 callers completing telephonic 
counseling sessions.  Over the past two years, the initiative assisted 3,972 families with 
foreclosure prevention counseling and 1,073 families were able to avoid foreclosure. 
Baltimore Homeownership Preservation Coalition 
The Baltimore Homeownership Preservation Coalition (BHPC) has 81 members representing 63 
organizations, including banks, nonprofits, realtors, foundations, state and local public agencies.  
Four foundations—the Abell Foundation, the Annie E. Casey Foundation, the Goldseker 
Foundation, and the Baltimore Community Foundation—have taken leadership roles in this 
effort. BHCP has completed two studies of foreclosure trends; one in Baltimore (September 
2006), and another throughout the state of Maryland (February 2008). In addition, the coalition 
launched a public awareness “Every Minute Counts” campaign in September 2006 and a second 
outreach effort with the theme “Mortgage Late? Don’t Wait!”  The campaign included ads on 
radio stations, billboards and buses. BHPC was also able to attract $1 million in funding for local 
nonprofits to expand their foreclosure counseling services in 2007. 
 
The Minnesota Homeownership Center 
Founded in 1993 and expanded statewide in 2001, the Minnesota Homeownership Center 
promotes sustainable homeownership services to low- and moderate-income households across 
Minnesota. Founding partners includes regional foundations, real estate and mortgage finance 
institutions, government agencies and other organizations concerned with affordable and 
sustainable homeownership. The center provides training, technical assistance and financial 
support to more than 20 community-based organizations for direct services to consumers. 
Funding sources include the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency, the Family Housing Fund and 
the Greater Minnesota Housing Fund. The center oversees a statewide marketing campaign and 
provides a user-friendly, interactive map on its website (www.hocmn.org) that links consumers 
to its nonprofit agencies throughout the state for foreclosure prevention services. The center is 
testing a new triage tool to reduce the average time required for foreclosure counseling to less 
than five hours per case. In 2007, the center’s agencies counseled more than 4,450 families.  
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 Policy Recommendations  
 
“In order to preserve scarce resources for the primary victims of the crisis, steps that directly or 
indirectly funnel bailout funds to the primary perpetrators of the crisis must be avoided,” 
cautions Michael D. Larson of Weiss Research, Inc., in his report to the Federal Reserve.31 “We 
have the means to create an environment in which buying a home can once again be viewed as 
the American dream in the years ahead. What we need most is the wisdom and the will to make 
the needed sacrifices now.” Here are several policy recommendations to address the mortgage 
crisis: 
 
1. Enforce existing predatory lending laws, penalize egregious lenders and provide targeted 
help to victimized consumers. 
Aggressively prosecute lenders, brokers, appraisers, and other parties for fraud and/or 
abusive lending under existing laws. Lenders who have been involved in abusive lending 
tactics should be prosecuted and fined heavily. Any fines or settlements from these cases 
should be directed to help borrowers who have received unaffordable mortgages, support  
nonprofits to assist with loan modifications and provide foreclosure-prevention counseling, 
legal assistance and rescue funds for these victimized borrowers. 
 
2. Reform FHA and expand its refinancing offerings. 
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was marginalized during the last decade as 
subprime lending took over a huge piece of the market. FHA could offer more on the 
refinance side, as President Bush has proposed, by expanding its role in providing affordable 
mortgages to help troubled borrowers refinance onerous subprime loans.  
 
3. License all mortgage brokers and improve consumer disclosures. 
Given that the vast majority of home mortgages are now originated by mortgage brokers, and 
the inherent conflict of interest between brokers and borrowers, a national licensing system 
for mortgage brokers is desperately needed. J. Michael Collins, the principal researcher for 
PolicyLab Consulting Group, suggests that “individual brokers be licensed and their identity 
number needs to be on every loan for at least seven years (the average life of a loan). That 
way, they can be held accountable for seven years for any misrepresentation in the loan, not 
unlike tax preparers or other professionals.” In addition, consumer disclosures that are 
provided in loan applications and before closings need to be in simpler and more transparent 
language. 
 
4. Expand federal banking oversight to all lenders, including non-bank independent mortgage 
companies and extend CRA reviews to all lenders. 
To a great extent, non-regulated lenders manufactured this foreclosure crisis by originating 
loans with extraordinarily loose underwriting standards. Federal banking regulators need to 
step up and provide oversight of these lenders. 
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5. Increase oversight of the secondary mortgage markets and the ratings agencies. 
The mistakes of the mortgage securitization industry have created havoc in world financial 
markets and also cry out for greater oversight and regulation.  
 
6. Develop suitability requirements for the mortgage lending industry. 
Establishing a suitability standard would require brokers and lenders to perform a more 
thorough evaluation of a borrower’s finances and his or her ability to repay a mortgage. They 
would presumably think twice about putting borrowers into inappropriate and unaffordable 
mortgages if they knew those borrowers could sue for damages. 
 
7. Require that all borrowers be qualified based on their ability to pay the fully indexed, fully 
amortizing payment on any mortgage. 
Many problematic types of mortgages in the current foreclosure crisis (such as interest-only 
loans, Option ARMs and 2/28s) had low initial “teaser rates.” Risky borrowers were 
approved for these mortgages based on the low initial payments rather than on the basis of 
the potentially higher payment when the mortgages were reset. 
 
8. Require escrow accounts for taxes and insurance on subprime mortgages. 
Many subprime borrowers got in trouble because they were qualified for risky loans without 
including the additional monthly cost of property insurance and taxes. Borrowers with low 
credit scores and high combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratios (above 80% CLTV) should be 
required to have escrow accounts for taxes and insurance.  
 
9. Invest in early intervention of foreclosures. 
Timely financial advice, credit counseling and assistance with loan modifications can make a 
huge impact in preventing foreclosures. The cost of this early intervention work is a small 
fraction of the cost of the negative consequences of foreclosures—for lenders, local 
economies and neighboring homeowners. According to a report by the Joint Economic 
Committee of U.S. Congress, “Foreclosures are costly—up to $80,000 for all stakeholders 
combined… [while] estimates suggest that foreclosure prevention costs approximately 
$3,300 per household.” 32 In short, it pays to prevent foreclosures. 
 
10. Focus more resources on preparing future homeowners. 
Funding should be dramatically increased to community groups to expand homeownership 
counseling and educational classes to encourage families to reduce their debts, increase their 
savings and become stronger financially before they become homeowners. 
 
11. Provide funding to plan and implement strategies to reuse vacant properties. 
Experts are predicting up to 750,000 vacant properties across the nation due to foreclosures 
in the next few years. The negative impact of these vacancies on communities will be 
potentially devastating in terms of the lost market value and tax revenues unless quick action 
is taken.  Funding is critical to begin planning and testing appropriate reuse strategies, which 
will vary based on community input and needs. 
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What Foundations Can Do  
 
Foundations can play key roles in addressing the current foreclosure crisis, both in their 
communities and across the nation. These roles include: 
 
 Convene Coalitions to Focus on Foreclosure Solutions 
Foundations can be conveners of local, regional or national coalitions where lenders, 
servicers, government officials, policymakers, nonprofit advocates and other community 
leaders can discuss foreclosure-related issues. Bringing these diverse audiences together to 
focus on solutions to the foreclosure crisis is an important role that foundations can play.  
Foundations can also share “best practices” from other areas and in this way, come to the 
table with practical ideas.  
 
For example, the Goldseker Foundation has long been active in addressing predatory lending 
issues in the Baltimore area. Therefore, as foreclosures began to surge the past few years, the 
foundation took a leadership role on this topic and helped convene local stakeholders.  
According to Goldseker Foundation Program Officer Laurie Latuda, “A coalition of public 
and private sector groups coalesced into the Baltimore Homeownership Preservation 
Coalition, which currently has 81 members representing 63 organizations, including banks, 
nonprofits, realtors, foundations, public officials, state and local government agencies. The 
coalition and its members have been on the forefront of finding short- and long-term 
solutions to the lending and foreclosure crisis for Baltimore and the state of Maryland. As a 
result, its impact on the foreclosure issue has been broad and far-reaching.” Among the 
coalition’s accomplishments are working with the City of Baltimore to adopt a six-point plan 
on foreclosure mitigation, actively participating in the Governor’s Task Force on 
Homeownership Preservation in Maryland in 2007, and helping to increase funding and 
professional certification training opportunities for local foreclosure counselors through 
NeighborWorks America. 
 
The Kresge Foundation has been instrumental in helping address the foreclosure crisis in 
Detroit.  Wendy Jackson, a program officer at Kresge, describes foreclosures in Detroit as “a 
deep and pervasive crisis with more than 25 percent of the city’s housing stock affected. The 
whole city is a ‘foreclosure hotspot.’ We are focusing on a comprehensive approach—by 
building community infrastructure—but it’s not just funding,” Jackson continues. “We serve 
as an active and aggressive convener and a broker for solutions in this arena.” The Kresge 
Foundation provided a significant leadership grant along with support from the Skillman 
Foundation, the Hudson-Webber Foundation, the McGregor Fund and the Community 
Foundation for Southeast Michigan to establish the “Office of Foreclosure Intervention and 
Response,” a public-private partnership that will coordinate and focus Detroit-area responses 
to the foreclosure crisis. 
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 Fund Research on Foreclosures 
Foundations can help support research on foreclosure issues so stakeholders can gain better 
understandings about the causes, impacts of and mitigation strategies for foreclosures.  Given 
the dramatic growth of foreclosures the past few years, many communities need to “size the 
problem” to understand the scale and identify “hot-spot locations” of local foreclosures 
before jumping to solutions.   
 
The Pew Center on the States and Pew’s Health and Human Services Program recently 
released a report entitled, “Defaulting on the Dream: States Respond to America’s 
Foreclosure Crisis.” This report is a comprehensive look at all 50 states and their responses 
to the subprime mortgage crisis. “State lawmakers who have shown they understand the high 
stakes involved in the nation’s foreclosure crisis—including the impact on state and local 
economies—deserve a lot of credit,” said Susan K. Urahn, managing director of the Pew 
Center on the States. “We hope some of the promising practices highlighted in this report can 
inform federal efforts and inspire others to take action.” 
 
The Goldseker Foundation and the Annie E. Casey Foundation have also been active in 
funding research of foreclosures in the City of Baltimore in 2006 and statewide in Maryland 
in 2008 to document “hot-spot locations” for foreclosures. “This research by The 
Reinvestment Fund gave us a better handle on the problem and highlighted some startling 
data in Prince George’s and Montgomery Counties,” notes Latuda of the Goldseker 
Foundation. The research projected 25,000 subprime mortgage foreclosures before the end of 
2009 potentially causing “a $2.73 billion loss in property-related wealth to Maryland 
residents and a $19.1 million loss in property tax.”33 
 
 Support Outreach Efforts such as the 888-995-HOPE Hotline 
A Roper Survey funded by Freddie Mac in 2007 suggested that 57 percent of delinquent 
borrowers are unaware their lenders may offer alternatives to help them avoid foreclosure.34 
Stronger outreach is needed to overcome borrowers’ fears and lack of knowledge. So far in 
2008, the national HOPE Hotline (888-995-HOPE) is reaching 4,000 troubled borrowers a 
day, providing them with immediate help from unbiased nonprofit counselors 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week. This remarkable hotline is free to consumers and is supported by the 
Homeownership Preservation Foundation (www.995hope.org) along with other partners. 
Foundations can extend the reach and impact of this effort by supporting this important 
hotline. 
 
The Goldseker Foundation also supports outreach efforts in Baltimore with several citywide 
public education campaigns. The most recent campaign tagline, “Mortgage Late? Don’t 
Wait!,” uses billboards, flyers, brochures, postcards, bill stuffers, print and bus ads to 
encourage borrowers to call for help.  This campaign has been so effective that it is being 
expanded to a statewide effort by the state of Maryland later this year. 
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The Greater Minnesota Housing Fund and the Family Housing Fund have provided long-
term support to the Minnesota Home Ownership Center, a network of 50 nonprofit, 
government and tribal organizations, to provide outreach and foreclosure counseling services 
to families throughout Minnesota.  
 
 Support Local and Regional Counseling Programs 
According to estimates, two to three million households may be facing foreclosure in the 
next two years.  Nonprofit counselors are able to provide invaluable support to these families 
by helping them negotiate loan workouts to remain in their homes or assisting them with a 
“soft landing,” thereby mitigating the negative impacts of foreclosures on these families and 
their communities. Nonprofit counselors are struggling under the surging workload in 
foreclosure counseling and desperately need greater financial support. In addition, increased 
financial counseling for potential homebuyers could help prevent more foreclosures in the 
future. Unfortunately, recent federal funding for foreclosure counseling offered by the 
National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program provides only short-term funding 
through 2008 and, by design, does not allow for building capacity but only for direct service 
delivery.  
 
By contrast, the Cleveland and George Gund Foundations have been substantial, patient, 
long-term supporters of building capacity in nonprofits in the Cleveland area for foreclosure 
counseling work. “We are trying to understand the nature of the crisis and trying to build the 
‘magnificent capacity’ of the nonprofit system to solve the problems of this horrible crisis – 
to build systematic solutions,” notes Robert Jaquay, associate director of the George Gund 
Foundation. “We’ve been well served and our philanthropy has done good things by patiently 
sticking with building nonprofit capacity—consistently building adaptive and responsive 
nonprofit capacity over the long-term (not just ‘three years and out’).” Jaquay continues, 
“Foundations need to reconsider the notions of wealth-building, by not letting people get 
beyond their financial capacity [by buying more expensive homes than they can afford]. 
Lower-income families need to have enough financial capacity to withstand economic 
hiccups.” 
 
 Help Develop Reuse Strategies for Vacant, Foreclosed Properties 
“No doubt, there will be one-quarter to three-quarter million REO (“Real Estate Owned”) 
properties coming down the pipeline [through lender foreclosures in the next few years],” 
warns Ford Foundation Program Officer George McCarthy, an acknowledged expert on the 
current mortgage crisis. “There is likely to be major federal activity put in place. The 
question is, how large a pool of federal money is needed to help localities fund strategies to 
manage and reuse vacant properties? And what’s the capacity on the ground to handle this 
volume?” McCarthy urges foundations to start planning intervention strategies with local 
communities to be able to acquire and reuse these vacant properties before they destroy the 
quality and value of neighborhoods across the country. 
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The Kresge Foundation is also taking a lead role in addressing the vacancy issue in Detroit 
where almost 40,000 foreclosures are expected in the next few years.  Jackson of Kresge 
notes that the foundation’s response is evolving but has included organizing planning 
sessions with stakeholders to identify potential strategies to address the collateral damage 
through vacant property campaigns, demolition strategies, land banks, “Adopt-A-Home” 
programs and even grassroots mobilization efforts to engage neighbors in maintaining nearby 
vacant properties. 
 
 Provide Resources to Legal Advocates and Direct Action 
Many homeowners facing foreclosure have been victimized by unscrupulous mortgage 
brokers and high-priced subprime loans. Some are victims of outright fraud and illegal 
activities, but few know their rights or can afford legal assistance. Foundations can provide 
financial support to legal aid groups to help provide legal representation and support to these 
distressed homeowners. 
 
Jaquay of the George Gund Foundation urges a comprehensive approach to the foreclosure 
problem. He adds, “We’ve made a conscious decision in grantmaking not to fund proposals 
to deal with just one consumer at a time, rather we are looking for proposals that create 
systematic changes and are able to assist large pipelines of consumers who are in trouble. We 
have supported and invested in ongoing systems that are responsive and useful to get a group 
engaged on the problem and thinking through solutions. For example, we funded legal 
advocacy work to build the political will for policy changes in the state legislature in Ohio.” 
 
The George Gund Foundation has also supported “direct action” organizing projects—such 
as the Eastside Organizing Project—to help neighborhood residents in Cleveland respond to 
the foreclosure crisis. This organization has effectively used direct actions against mortgage 
brokers and predatory lenders to negotiate agreements with lenders and servicers to 
renegotiate ARMs, provide triage to clients in remediation, and literally prevent hundreds of 
foreclosures. 
 
 Define a National Policy Role for Foundations 
It is time, suggests George McCarthy, for foundations to collaborate, show leadership and 
develop a national voice to address key policy issues related to this mortgage crisis.  This 
coalition of foundations could press for stronger regulation of mortgage lenders, stronger 
enforcement of mortgage lending laws, more funding for counseling and refinancing 
strategies, fairer bankruptcy reform, and a comprehensive solution to the current foreclosure 
crisis rather than the temporary band-aid solutions applied to date.  
 
“Perhaps we’ve forgotten the lessons of the Great Depression,” muses Jaquay.  “When 
markets turn sour, regulations are needed for markets to function correctly. Without those 
regulations, excessive greed will win out and many innocent people will get hurt.” 
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APPENDIX A.  NIGHTMARE MORTGAGES 
 
Here is a sampling of the vast and troubling array of mortgages that have trapped unsuspecting 
homeowners in the current surge of mortgage defaults and foreclosures. These mortgage 
products are risky because: 
 They are inappropriate loan products for many customers, especially lower-income 
households, but tend to be very lucrative for the lenders. 
 They can result in greatly increased payments as the monthly mortgage payments move from 
low “teaser” rates to fully indexed rates. 
 The amount owed on the mortgage could be greater than the value of the home. 
 Negative amortization could occur; the principal balance owed by the borrower could 
increase rather than decrease over time. 
 
Interest-Only Mortgages 
An interest-only mortgage allows a borrower to pay only the interest on the loan for a certain 
period of time. After that, the borrower must repay both the principal and the interest. Many 
interest-only mortgages are adjustable rate, meaning that the interest rate changes over time. 
These mortgages are dangerous because if a borrower only makes the minimum monthly 
payment, the mortgage debt may grow rather than decrease over time. If the borrower was 
qualified on the basis of the interest-only payment, a fully amortizing payment may not be 
affordable. 
 
Piggyback Mortgages 
Piggyback mortgages combine a first mortgage with a second mortgage that close 
simultaneously. This combination reduces the borrower’s down payment and typically means 
that mortgage insurance is not required. For example, an 80-20 piggyback is made up of a first 
mortgage covering 80 percent of the purchase price and a second mortgage covering the 
remaining 20 percent. These mortgages are dangerous because a borrower has little or no equity 
in the property. Moreover, the existence of a piggyback loan makes resolving a default on the 
first mortgage through a loan modification much more difficult, if not impossible. 
 
Low Doc or No Doc Mortgages 
A Low Doc or No Doc mortgage has traditionally been targeted to borrowers who have good 
credit, but because they are self-employed or lack records (such as payroll stubs and W-2 forms) 
were unable to meet the loan documentation requirements. Similar loans are called Stated Asset, 
Stated Income, No Asset or No Income Loans. Borrowers typically paid higher interest rates and 
fees to qualify for these mortgages. These loans were mainstreamed within the past five years. 
These loans have been given the name “Liar Loans” because studies have shown that borrower 
incomes were overstated in more than 50 percent of cases. 
 
Payment-Option or Option-ARM Mortgages 
A Payment-Option mortgage allows a borrower to choose among several payments each month. 
The options typically include a traditional payment of principal and interest; an interest-only 
payment; or a minimum payment based on a low initial teaser rate. The difference between the 
option amount that is paid and the amount that should have been paid based on the actual loan 
terms is added to the loan balance, thus creating negative amortization whereby the mortgage 
balance owed by the borrower is growing every month. 
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An Option-ARM is an adjustable-rate mortgage with flexible payment options, monthly interest 
rate adjustments and very low minimum payments in the early years. These are also derogatorily 
called “Exploding ARMs” since they often result in greatly increased mortgage payments after 
the initial teaser rate ends. When the borrower makes only the minimum monthly payment, it is 
insufficient to pay all of the interest due, so more could be owed than was initially borrowed. 
 
Balloon Mortgages 
A balloon mortgage is payable in full after a period that is shorter than the amortization term. On 
a five-year balloon loan, for example, the payment is usually calculated over a 30-year period, 
and the balance at the end of the fifth year must be repaid or refinanced. In most cases, this 
means the borrower has to refinance the mortgage at the end of the balloon period, risking that 
the new mortgage may have higher monthly payments as well as having the expense of new 
closing fees. 
 
Cash-Out Refinancing Mortgages (103s, 107s and 125s) 
This type of mortgages allow a homeowner to refinance his or her home for more than it is 
actually worth in order to make home improvements, or worse yet, to pay off credit card debt or 
buy a new car. However, the borrower’s home value may not appreciate enough to cover the 
value of the new mortgage, and these loans typically come with high interest rates and fees.  
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APPENDIX B.  FORECLOSURE IMPLICATIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
 Stakeholder Implications of Foreclosure 
 Homeowners  Loss of stable housing 
 Legal, financial and tax consequences 
 Mortgage Insurers  Claims paid 
 Loan Servicers  Loss of income stream from servicing loans 
 Secondary Market  Losses/expenses beyond insurance proceeds 
 Cities  Possible costs of boarding up vacant structures 
 Possible erosion of tax base 
 Neighborhoods  Negative neighborhood image 
 Declining property values 
 
Sources: Moreno, Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention Program (1995) and Quercia, Cowan and Moreno (2004) 
 
 
 
Source: J. Michael Collins “Analyzing Elements of Leading Default-Intervention Programs.” 
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APPENDIX C.  TYPICAL LOAN DELINQUENCY AND FORECLOSURE PROCESS 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from George McCarthy, “Reducing Foreclosures’ Negative Effects on Neighborhoods.” 
Presentation to the Detroit Neighborhood Forum. April 2008. 
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APPENDIX D.  TYPICAL LOSS MITIGATION OPTIONS 
 
Option Beneficial If… Allows Borrower to… 
 
Forbearance Borrower has a source of 
funds to bring the 
account current by a 
certain date. 
Arrange for a temporary 
reduction or suspension 
of payments for a 
specified time period, 
after which another 
option must be agreed 
upon to bring the account 
current. 
 
Repayment Plan Borrower’s financial 
difficulties are short-term. 
Resume making regular 
mortgage payments in 
addition to a portion of 
the past due payments. 
 
Modification Borrower can make 
payments on the loan, 
but does not have 
enough money to bring 
the account current, or 
the borrower cannot 
afford the total amount of 
the current payment. 
 
Modify the terms of the 
original loan to make the 
payments more 
affordable. 
Short Sale Payoff amount of 
borrower’s loan is greater 
than the fair market value 
of the property. 
 
Possibly sell the home for 
less than what is owed. 
Assumption Loan is non-assumable, 
but there is a qualified 
buyer. 
 
Possibly sell the home for 
less than what is owed. 
Deed-in-Lieu Borrower has had the 
property for sale for a 
period of time with no 
activity. 
 
Release the title to the 
property as settlement of 
the debt. 
 
Source: PolicyLab Consulting Group. “Analyzing Elements of Leading Default-Intervention Programs” 
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APPENDIX E.  LOSS MITIGATION OPTIONS BY LOAN TYPE 
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APPENDIX F.  OVERVIEW OF THE MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION PROCESS 
 
 
Source:  J. Michael Collins, PolicyLab Consulting Group.
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